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FOREWORD
Throughout its history the Religious Society of Friends has
emphasized the importance of the right ordering of the inward personal life. The central feature of the "inward way" is believed to be
man's relationship to God. Out of this spiritual junction flow the
currents which shape the ordered personal life and which nurture
right relationships with others.
But Quakers have also sought to keep sensitive to the manner in
which institutions and governments have imposed patterns inhibiting the development of the spiritually centered life. Sometimes by
themselves, but more often in association with others, Friends have
attempted to improve the social and political environment. These
efforts of individual Quakers, and at times of the full Religious Society, have occasionally brought Friends in opposition to the government under which they lived. These experiences have often led
Friends to make suggestions for improving governmental or intergovernmental machinery.
The issues of war and peace have now become so engrossing,
and these questions have merged so fully into problems of governmental policy and international organization, that a present-day
Quaker concern in this area needs no special apology.
William Penn in his "Essay Towards the Present and Future
Peace of Europe
suggested that "peace is maintained by justice,
which is a fruit of government ."In discussing the establishment
of a government for Europe, he considered problems of weighted
representation, methods of voting, and the type of housing and architectural design that would facilitate the conduct of inter-governmental business. He believed that international war was a scourge which
could be eliminated only by international organization.
Many of the questions with which William Penn wrestled are
still unsolved. But today they appear against a grimmer backdrop.
The compulsion to seek and find solutions now draws on a deep
foreboding.that the issues are nothing less than those of human
survival.
Ever since the founding of the United Nations in 1945, Quakers
have been actively interested in it. Official observers in New York,

..."

..

Geneva, and Paris, appointed by the Friends World Committee for
Consultation, have kept in touch with various aspects of the U.N.
and its Specialized Agencies. In world-wide practical service the
American Friends Servick c o h n ' e i frequently has found itself
working in close relation with the United Nations, helping Arab,
German, and Korean refugees, or meeting other needs of body and
spirit in cooperation with UNRRA, UNICEF, and other U.N.
agencies. .
The United Nations has already figured in previous AFSC
studies-The United States and the Soviet Union (1949), Steps to
Peace (1952), and Toward Security Through Disarmament (1952).
Another study published in 1955, Speak T r d to Power, instead of
proposing specific next steps to reduce tension, explores some general
alternatives to violence in international conflict.
This present study has been prepared largely by members of the
Quaker staff at the United Nations in New York and of the Quaker
International Center in Geneva. Background studies were first prepared dealing with three aspects of U.N.'s work with which Friends
have had cansiderabli experience: economic and social &airs, the
peaceful settlement of,disputes, and disarmament. At an early stage
these papers were reviewed by panels nominated by the Regional
Offices of the American Friends Suvice Committee in the United
States. The general analysis and the conclusions grow out of these
background studies.'~hestudies themselves have been included for
the benefit of those readers who would like to go more deeply into
&e issues involved.
Like the preceding reports, this one has been approved for publication.by the AFSC Executive Board, not as an 0~cia1'~ronouncement, but in the interest of stimulating public discussion of the issues
raised, and in the hope that such discussion will contribute to the
formation of policies that will bring peace. No proposals for improvement in evernmental or inter-governmental machinery, even if accepted, will by themselves bring the
world to the external peace it seeks. Peace is a spiritual condition
which reflects man's relationship both to God and to his fellow men.
But suggestions such as we have madej might, if accepted, be useful
in lightening man's burden and aiding his search for the road to
peace. It is in this spirit that the proposals are offered.
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"There are two ways by which mankind has sought a good and
satisfying life. The first requires a change in the world around us; the
second, a change within ourselves. By the firs# we attnnpt to order
our environment so that it biil satisfy our desires; by the second we
lrttempt to order our inner life so. that happiness and satisfaction are
attPinkd independently of the outer world?.
-Howard

Brinton

- 'Wh& Two Ways Meet," Critique By Eternity,
Pendle Hill, 1943.

HOW CAN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS BE INCREASED?
The United Nations has now ended its first decade of existence
and a time of stock-taking approaches. The representatives at San
Francisco in 1945realized that they were not creating a perfect instrument and provided that in its Tenth Session the General Assembly
should at least consider whether or not to call a conference to review
the Charter in the light of experience. Thus, in 1955 the United
Nations faces this problem.
There is now much discussion of a Review Conference. The
United States has indicated that it favors calling such a conference.
A number of other states including several of the leading European
countries are known to be doubtful. The U.S.S.R. has thus far expressed opposition. Since a majority vote of the members of the
Tenth General Assembly, or a two-thirds vote of any subsequent
General Assembly, supplemented by the vote of any seven members
of the Security Council, will be sufficient to call the conference, there
is at least a good possibility that it will be held.
To What Extent Has the
United Nations Been Successful?
Much of the present interest in Charter review stems from the
fact that not all the original hopes for the U.N. have been realized,
and it is natural to ask whether this is due to defects in the Charter.
First of all, it is necessary to establish the standards by which
success is to be judged. Probably the best criteria are the purposes for
which the Organization was avowedly created. The Charter states
them in Article I.
1. To maintain international peace and security.
2. To develop friendly relations among nations.
3. To help solve international problems of an economic, social,
cultural, or humanitarian character and to promote human
rights and freedoms for all.
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the
attainment of these common ends.

What are some of the accomplishments of the U.N. which
should be recognized in evaluating its success?
Briefly, it serves as a focus for the aspirations of most peoples of
the world for the establishment af world order. It provides a meeting
place-a forum in which nations can be heard. It has survived "cold
war" tensions for nearly a decade and continues to work toward
improvement of the lot of underdeveloped peoples. The actions of
States which administer trust territories (and of States which report
to the U.N. on their administration of territories whose inhabitants
are not yet self-governing) are subject to increasing scrutiny by
world public opinion through an international body.
In the economic and social area the accomplishments of the
Specialized Agencies and of the U.N. Technical Assistance Program
are important-though not so well known as they should be. Levels
of health and standards of livhg are being improved. Refugees have
.been given temporary maintenance and in some areas considerable
progress has been made in their resettlement.
. Further, the U.N. has played an important part in bringing an
end to fighting in Kashmir, Indonesia, and Palestine. It has contributed to a political settlement in Indonesia, and to political pacification in Iran, northern Greece, Palestine, and Korea, though it must
be recognized that in many of these situations permanent solutions
have not yet been achieved.
On the other hand, assured world peace seems far in the future,
with war still a distinct threat. ~ffectfvitooperation among nations
is incomplete. Members have not iived up 'td their pledges,' for exam.ple, to reject war as a method of settling international disputes. In
' Palestine, while an uncertain truce has been arranged, it is constantly
,being broken and little real reconciliation has been achieved. In
Korea, prolonged war has devastated a.country which is still divided.
A final example may be drawn from the field of disarmament, where
nothing can yet be recorded in the way of tangible accomplishment,
though recent developments appear more promising.
Thus we see that U.N.'s successes in achieving its first two purposes have been limited although some accomplishments have been
recorded. The third purpose has been partially achieved, but even
here there is much more to do. The fourth purpose has been met in
so far as the U.N. has succeeded in serving its other purposes.
While the United Nations has survived the pressures arid the
strains put upon it, the gravity and the complexity of the problems
-
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confronting the world have increased. It would appear likely, therefore, that if the United Nations is to prove adequate to the issues
confronting the world in the next decade, some changes in its structure and functioning will need to be made.
In What Directions Should
the U.N. Be Encouraged to Develop?
What changes in structure or functioning would enable the
United Nations to become a more effective instrument? Interested
groups and individuals have given a great deal of attention to this
matter and many proposals have been made. These proposals range
all the way from those which would remove from the U.N. much.
of the political power it presently possesses to the very substantial
changes proposed by the World Federalists, who see a solution to the
present world problem in the creation of a world federation capable
of making and enforcing world law.
This pamphlet will not attempt to examine a wide variety of
proposals but will take a slightly different approach, dealing with
three areas in which Friends have traditionally been interested: the
development of U.N.'s economic and social activities, the peaceful
settlement of disputes, and disarmament. Three "background" studies have been prepared which deal with these subjects. In each case
we have examined U.N. experience and have suggested changes
which appear to us to need consideration.
Some of the suggested improvements merely affect practice or
procedure, requiring no changes in structure. Some depend upon
structural or organizational changes, but do not necessarily call for
changes in the Charter itself. In cases of this sort methods of evolutionary change might be used. We may find, however, that some
changes in the Charter would be unavoidable if certain suggestions
are to be implemented. In these cases it would be necessary to seek
amendment of the Charter, though this need not be in connection
with a full Charter Review Conference. Such changes might be
accomplished through the regular amendment procedure provided
for in Article 108.
Before taking up proposals which might suggest the need for
Charter amendment, let us look at an area of U.N.'s work in which
evolutionary change has taken place-U.N.'s approach to dependent
peoples.

An Example of Evolutionmy Change-The

Colonial Field:
Members of the U.N. who administer territories whose people have
not yet attained a full measure of self-government declare in the
Charter that the interests of the inhabitants of such territories are
paramount, and that they accept as a sacred trust the obligation to
promote the well-being of the inhabitants. They agree to assist in
creating free political institutions and to develop self-government.
This declaration, in contrast with the Trusteeship chapters of the,
Charter, does not give the U.N. any right to supervise the adminis- ' .
tration of colonial territories. The only obligation specifically as-.'
sumed by the colonial powers is "to transmit regularly to the
Secretary-General [of the United Nations] for information purposes
. statistical and other information of a technical nature relating
to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories."
The rising tide of anti-colonialism since the Charter was drafted
ten years ago has led to an extension of the strict terms of the Charter.
The General Assembly has set up a committee to examine the information transmitted by the colonial powers. Then, by debating this
committee's reports, the U.N. in fact debates conditions in colonial
territories. Moreover, the avowed purpose of these debates is not to
engage in an academic discussion on statistical information transmitted by colonial powers, but to influence the administration of
colonies. Finally, although there is no obligation to transmit information on political conditions in colonial territories, it has been impossible in practice to keep political considerations out of the debates.
In much of this evolution the colonial powers themselves have
participated, though with reluctance and some reservations. They
have placed at the disposal of the United Nations information
broader in character than a restrictive interpretation of the Charter
would suggest; they have shared in the discussion of colonial conditions; on occasion they have implemented recommendations of the
General Assembly, though they would probably say that they have
only done so when these recommendations have corresponded with
their existing policies.
There are different views about the wisdom of the developments
referred to, but there is no disputing the fact that the developments
have taken place. Moreover, it is quite possible for further develop
ments to take place in this field without amendment of the Charter.
One way this could be achieved would be by voluntary action on
the part of Member States. A colonial power, for example, could
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decide to transmit political information to the U.N. (as some already
do) although the Charter contains no specific obligation to do this.
A colonial power could decide to place some or all of its dependencies
under the Trusteeship System, thus assuming increased obligations
to the United Nations. A Member State could decide that part of its
territory, though not a colony in the accepted sense, is nevertheless
a territory whose people have not yet attained a full measure of selfgovernment and -that therefore there is an obligation to transmit
information on the territory to the U.N.
It would also be possible for the U.N. to extend its functions
without such voluntary action by Member States. The U.N. could
undertake comparative studies of regions of the world in which there
are both colonies and sovereign states, to see if there is any experience
of sovereign states which would be of value to colonial territories,
and vice versa. ?'he Committee on Information from Non-SelfGoverning Territories might consider it desirable and within its
terms of reference, for example, to secure information on measures
taken in pursuance of General Assembly resolutions not only from
governments and Specialized Agencies but also from qualified nongovernmental organizations having consultative status with the
Economic and Social Council. A more extensive change, which
might be acceptable through agreement in the Assembly, would be
to permit non-governmental organizations with special colonial interest to participate in an expert capacity in the discussions of the
Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.
Let us turn now to U.N.'s economic and social activities to see
if there are desirable changes that would improve the work of the
Organization
and, if so, how these changes should be brought about.
Economic and Social Actiuities: The accomplishments during
the past ten years of the United Nations in this field are very sub
stantial. The Technical Assistance Program has sought to raise the
standard of living in some 100 countries and territories. Over 3000
technical experts have been recruited and an even larger number of
fellowships granted. Seventy-six governments and the Vatican have
contributed some $85,000,000 to this program.
The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), financed entirely by voluntary contributions from governments and private individuals, is working currently in over 90 countries and territories in an
effort to improve the health and welfare of children and their
mothers. It works closely with the World Health Organization and

the Food and Agricultural Organization. The Children's Fund is
said to be reaching now some ZU,000,OOO additional children every
year through its health centers, i t s provision of insecticides9vaccines
and antibiotics, and its supplying of powdered milk ta combat
.
malnutrition.
The Specialized Agencies of the United Nations work through
the expanded program of Technical Assistance. During the year 1954
alone, they aided governments in 80 countries and territories
sending experts to the field and giving advanced training to
300 technicians.
Our background study suggests that U.N.'s work in this field
has, reached out into so many areas that a large amount of the time
of the Economic and Social Council has inevitably been devoted to
questions of coordination. The Council has already undertaken a
review of its activities to ske Re its work could be focused more effectively and if its procedures could be improved. The Secretary-General
has also made certain recommendations for the "streamlining" of
secretariat activities in these areas. The Council has been experimenting with a plan under which it has held three or four sessions of
shorter length in a year-though this experience has not been wholly
successful.
Three additional problems are of special importance.
The first relates to the need for-governmental contributions to
the programs under the supervision of the Council to be projected
on a basis which will permit more orderly planning. This is a special
need in the Technical Assistance Programs but the principle applies
equally to all.
Secondly, there is a need for governments (and this applies
especially to the United States) to channel through the United Nations a greater proportion of the funds they have available for economic development. The U.N. Technical Assistance Program is &cient and well-managed and funds should be available permitting its
expansion.
The third problem concerns the tendency, in view of the limited
representation of the underdeveloped countries in ECOSOC, for
debates in the Council of special interest to those countries to be
reproduced later in the Second and Third Committees of the General
Assembly where these countries have, relatively, a stronger voice.
This practice detracts from decision-malung m the C;ouncil. Varrous
proposals have been made for meeting this problem, including sug+--
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gestians that-the membership of ECOSOC be increased.-J3utin .view
of the .need for the General Assembly to approve many of the basic
decisions taken in the Council and of the need for establishing priorities in the Council's work rather than extending it, the suggestion for
enlarging the Council has not met with general favor.
If the membership of the Economic and Social Council were to
be increased, this would require Charter amendment. Otherwise, it
would appear that the proposals for improvement in the handling of
U.N. economic and social affairs would not require any Charter
change. The Council has the power to restrict and set its own agenda,
to regulate the time and length of its meetings, and to determine the
types of subordinate organs it establishes. It can also take any action
which appears desirable to improve its consultative relationships with
non-governmental organizations. The evolutionary process, supplemented by new supporting action by national governments, is likely
to prove adequate as the means of developing the economic and
social functions of the United Nations. .
The Peaceful Settlement of Di~cptctes:While the United Nations
has had some success in settling international conflicts, serious limitations in its work in this field have also been apparent. Some people
attribute these limitations largely to the conflicts of the "cold war"
and to the recurring use of the veto in the Security Council. Others
believe that U.N.'s principal work in the political field should be the
peaceful settlement of disputes and that this work is handicapped by
being so closely related in the Charter to the provisions for enforcement powers.
. A glance back over the past ten years suggests that the United
Nations has not done too badly in bringing armed hostilities to an
end where military action has broken out. The record is not unimpressive in Indonesia, Kashmiryand Palestine. While opinions differ
as to U.N.'s responsibility for the final truce in Korea, it is cleai that
resolutions of the General Assembly provided the framework within
which the ultimate truce terms were agreed upon. The United' Nations provided the facilities for the conference in Geneva in April
and May 1954,at which the I n d d h i n a truce was achieved, and for
the four-power meeting in Julyy1955.
The United Nations' record is less clear in the achievement of
political settlements. Undoubtedly,' the fact that %thesehave been
earnestly sought in many conflict areas has either made possible the
achievement of a truce or has prevented military conflict from again

breaking out. But it is only in the Indonesian and Iranian conflicts
that political settlements were finally achieved; and in the case of
Indonesia, the future of West New Guinea (West Irian) remains a
matter of dispute.
To what extent can U.N.'s work in the pacific settlement of
disputes be improved ?
In the background study on peaceful settlement it is suggested
that there is a useful trend in the U.N. toward a more informal (and
less legislative) approach to conflict settlement. This development
might be accelerated if more initiative were taken by the SecretaryGeneral or by the President of the General Assembly. There might
be less initial emphasis in the Security Council, or in the General
Assembly, on passing a resolution. Already we have seen the development in the Security Council of the practice of taking a "consensus
of views" (Quakers would call it taking "the sense of the meeting")
instead of always taking a formal vote. The resource of able and
experienced people available to the Council and Assembly for detailed negotiations might be increased by reconstituting the International Panel on Inquiry and Conciliation. This is a panel of persons
nominated by governments with a view to their availability for
missions of f act-finding .or conciliation.
None of' these suggestions can take the place of a firm determination on the part of governments to make greater use of United
Nations facilities in the settlement of disputes,-&, if they are a party
to a conflict, to give the most careful consideration to U.N. proposals
for adjustment. But a review of experience does indicate that in these
areas the means already lie at hand for improving U.N.'s approach.
Only three of the proposals advanced in the background study
involve any questions of Charter change. The study suggests that a
new effort should be made to restrict the use of the veto on matters
relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes. It also suggests that
universal membership in U.N. might enhance the organization's
work. Some people take the position that if the U.S.S.R. and the
other Permanent Members of the Security Council were willing
- to
agree to any limitations on the use of the veto on questions of
peaceful settlement, or on questions of membership, it would be
easier to get agreement to a modification in practice-with the
Charter provisions remaining intact. These persons point to the
"understanding" that now exists in the Security Council that an
abstention on the part of a Permanent Member is not considered as
-

a veto.,They suggest that these Members of the Council .might also
agree, formally or informally, that on the two questions of peaceful
settlement and membership the unanimity rule would be set aside.
This would permit the Security Council to act on peaceful settlement
questions on the vote of any seven Members and would permit new
Members of the U.N. to be elected by the General Assembly with
the concurring vote of any seven Members of the Security Council.
While it is possible that an agreement might be secured under
which the Security Council could discharge its obligation on memo
bership questions by a vote of any seven Members, it is much less
likely that such an agreement could be secured covering all questions
of peaceful settlement. The U.S.S.R. would likely insist on any
change so fundamental being reconciled with Article 27, paragraph
S i n which the unanimity rule is laid down. Indeed, it is probable
that the U.S.S.R. would not be willing to consider so basic a change
without its being linked to some new developments in the security
field-such as a disarmament agreement.
The background study further suggests that the wording of
Article 37 be amended to eliminate the restriction on recommendations of terms of settlement to disputes "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." It points out that the
freedom to recommend settlement terms is an important power in
the hands of a negotiating body.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that United Nations work in the
peaceful settlement of disputes would be enhanced by three changes.
Two of these changes might be secured by agreement among the
Permanent Members of the Security Council to modify the use of
the veto. It is probable, however, that such an agreement might be
reached more easily if it were sought in the context of a Review
Conference where it could be linked with other developments in the
security field. Whether the-three changes would in fact be easier to
achieve if they were pursued in the form of Charter amendments
would probably depend upon whether other security proposals
would be likely to have the support of the major powers.
We come thus to the disarmament field without having found
in U.N.'s economic and social activities the need for changes that
call for Charter Revision. In U.N.'s work to settle disputes three
changes ire needed, but whether two of these should be sought
through amendment would depend upon the other security and
disarmament proposals being made.

Disamammt: Disarmament discussions in the United Nations
have thus far centered around four major problems:
,
1. Leuels of national amties and military budgets.
There is agreement that national armies should be reduced, that
the reductions should be substantial, and that disarmament should
be in stages. The first move would be a "freezing" or "standstill" in
armies and weapons as of an agreed date.
The U.S.S.R. and the Western powers have been in dispute as to
the levels to which reductions would be made. The U.S.S.R. has
wanted reductions by one-third. The Western powers have held that
a plan of this nature, if accompanied by a prohibition of atomic 6'
weapons, would give Russia with her large land armies a great military advantage. The Western powers have wanted reductions to
levels which would provide a balance of military power without
reference to nuclear weapons. As a result of the negotiations in
London in April and May of 1955, it would appear that the U.S.S.R.
and the Western powers are now much closer together, and that
there is general agreement on levels of from 1,000,000 to 1,500,000
men each for the U.S., U.S.S.R., and China, and 650,000 men each
for the United Kingdom and France.
Both the U.S.S.R. arid the West suggest that these reductions
should be a prelude to further disarmament to levels considered
essential for internal security and to meet obligations under the
united Nations Charter. '
2. Weapons of mass destruction.
It seems to be agreed that the manufacture, possession and use
of these weapons should be prohibited, although agreement is lacking on the exact timetable under which the prohibition would be
put into operation.
- 3. Inspecden.
There is agreement that the inspection system would be international and permanent and that inspection would be continuous."^;^,^
Violations or suspected violations would be reported to a United
Nations organ.
j,i
4. ~n f omemcnt.'
Disagreement ha&continued over the procedure which would
follow a report by inspectors that a violation, or suspected.~violation,
of the disarmament agreement.had taken place.
L:',,., , ' 4
In ;he background studj w e have' suggested that the interna-
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facturing plants and to possible military staging points, and complete
freedom in reporting to the central inspection authorities. We suggest the establishment of a Disarmament Authority, which would
supervise the carrying out of disarmament under the general agreement or treaty and to which the inspection force would be responsible. This Authority should operate by majority vote. It should
have the power to verdy inspection reports, to attempt through its
regular channels to get compliance or cooperation, to take cases of
suspected violations to judicial review, and, if all other agreed means
fail or are inadequate, to report violations or alleged violations of
the disarmament treaty to the Security Council, to the General Assembly, and to all signatories of the disarmament treaty.
We have suggested that the problems of inspection, verification
and compliance lend themselves better to judicial treatment than to
political treatment. A major effort should therefore be made to get
the agreement, especially of the Permanent Members of the Security
Council, to an extension of the international legal system to cover
enforcement problems. This might necessitate revision of the Statute of the present International Court, or it might necessitate establishment of a new court which would deal only with disarmament
problems.
A development of this kind would call for a very precise spelling
out of international judicial relationships in the disarmament treaty.
It would need, for instance, to be quite clear who the juridical
"parties" were against which the Disarmament Authority could seek
restraining orders. The need for an equal precision, however, seems
already to be called for in defining the freedom of movement and
investigation of the international inspection authorities. Countries
covered by the disarmament treaty would need either to agree in
the treaty that the work of the inspection force did not constitute
interference in their domestic affairs, or an amendment of the domestic affairs clause in the Charter (Article 2 (7)) would need to be
made. At the same time that these juridical questions were being
spelled out in detail in relation to the inspection system, it would
not seem unreasonable for parallel juridical provisions to be made
in connection with enforcement provisions.
While it is impossible at this stage to project the details of a
politically possible disarmament agreement, it appears most unlikely
that any agreement could be secured which would completely eliminate the veto in the Security Council on enforcement action against

any Member State believed to be violating the agreement. We have
suggested, however, that the Disarmament Authority report both
to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, where the veto
does not apply. But more importantly, we have suggested that the
enforcement system be based first upon an administrative effort to
get correction and secure compliance, and second upon a judicial
effort. We believe this method of handling suspected violations
would be more conducive to settlement. If properly devised, it
should be adequate for all but major violations.

CONCLUSIONS ON CHARTER REVIEW
How Should Further Development
of the United Nations Be Fostered?
There appear to be five general approaches to the question of
U.N. development. These attitudes may be summarized as follows:
1. The United Nations has already been given too much power.
What is needed is a return to traditional diplomacy and to a
reliance on national strength.
2. The Charter is good enough. What is needed is for the members to live up to it and use it properly.
3. Changes and improvements in U.N. are needed, but the
evolutionary process has already brought important changes.
We should rely on these evolutionary processes, supplemented by "interpretation" of existing Charter provisions.
4. Changes and improvements are needed. Let us make use of
evolutionary development and Charter interpretation, but
also let us seek other changes through the regular amendment procedure-without taking on the risks which might
be involved in a full Charter Review Conference.
5. The changes required in the U.N. Charter are so substantial
that a Charter Review Conference should be voted by
the Tenth or by some subsequent Session of the General
Assembly.
The first approach reflects a nostalgic desire to turn back the
clock of history and to ignore the degree to which modern communications have made the world interdependent. This pamphlet
suggests that we have little in common with it.
Nor would it appear that the second approach is adequate to the
problems with which the U.N. and the world are now faced. Those
persons who take the second position usually put the emphasis on
work for a settlement of cold war tensions, rapprochement of the
major powers, and a re-dedication to the principles of the Charter.
These things are good. If the Permanent Members of the Security
Council could be brought to cooperate with one another and to observe the existing provisions of the Charter, the risk of war would

certainly decline. Admonitions to live up to certain parts of the
Charter are frequently useful and necessary but such advice also
serves to remind-u.N.-members of other parts of the Charter which
have become obsolete. Our studies have suggested the desirability of
evolution and change. Thus any exclusive pursuit of the second approach has distinct limitations.
With regard to the third approach (evolution plus interpretation) it has been suggested that in the economic and social field the
evolutionary approach is likely to be adequate and that in this area
Charter amendment is not required. We have also considered the
U.N.'s responsibility for dependent peoples, and have shown how
development has taken place, and can take place in the future, without Charter amendment. It could be argued convincingly that the
evolutionary method is adequate to secure more radical changes in
this field. Though we have not in fact discussed the question in
this pamphlet, we do not see the necessity in this area for radical
changes.
In the peaceful settlement of disputes, three changes were suggested which could involve Charter amendment. These were the
elimination of the veto on the peaceful settlement of disputes and
on membership, and the elimination of the restriction in Article 37
on recommending terms of settlement to "disputes likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security." These three
changes might be brought about &rough the regular amendment
procedure (Article 108). It was suggested that these amendments
should be brought into a Charter Review Conference only if new
developments in the disarmament and security field would appear
to justify the holding of such a conference. It is possible that in such
a setting, agreement to restrict the use of the veto and to amend
Article 37 might be easier to secure.
The review of the disarmament problem brought no clear conviction that Charter amendments were an indispensable accompaniment to genuine progress. Substantial additional powers for the
United Nations would need to be spelled out in the disarmament
treaty. The signatories might agree that the provisions of the treaty
represented an interpretation of certain sections of the Charter.
final assessment of the need for Charter change in this area must
await, however, a more precise knowledge than we now have as to
the over-all requirements of a disarmament plan.

Should a Charter Review
Conference Be Held?
The real questions appear to be:
1. Would it be easier to secure any useful Charter changes if
they were grouped together for consideration in a Review
Conference ?
2. Would the political forces (including that of public opinion)
that would surround the preparation for, and the holding
of, such a conference be such as to make more likely the
achievement of our revision goals ?
3. Would the likelihood of approval for these Charter changes
by Member States be enhanced by their being linked in such
a conference with final agreement on a disarmament treaty
-even if the disarmament plan itself did not require Charter
revision ?
If any changes in the Charter are to be made there is much to
be said for their being agreed upon, and for their being submitted to
the Member States for ratification, as one inter-related group of
amendments. However, for this approach to be successful and for it
to lead to an actual strengthening of the United Nations, it would
need to be based upon certain favorable conditions, including:
1. The existence of sufficient world public opinion in favor of
strengthening the United ~ a t i o i sand i f certain specific
proposals for Charter change to steady the political context
in which a Review Conference was held.
2. The willingness of the U.S.S.R. and the other major powers
at least to give serious consideration to the proposed Charter
changes. Before they can become effective, charter amendments require ratification by two-thirds of the Members of
the United Nations, including the five Permanent Members
of the Security Council.
We believe that the further development and strengthening of
the United Nations must be accompanied by disarmament. If any
doubt remained, the experience in Korea should have impressed us
all with the inadequacy and the danger of reliance on a collective
security system in a world being competitively rearmed. It is, we
believe, only in the context of world disarmament that world political security can be achieved. We believe that this is becoming increasingly evident to both the U.S.S.R. and to the West. While we
-

believe that disarmament to the levels being considered in the
present negotiations would represent a tremendous advance, we
would like to see more substantial goals firmly set.
We think it likely that even the minor Charter amendments
suggested in this study would not be accepted in the absence of
some form of disarmament agreement. We conclude that a prerequisite to a firm General Assembly decision to hold a Charter
Review Conference must be sufficient progress on disarmament to
give reasonable assurance that a disarmament agreement could precede such a conference-or that final approval of such an agreement
could be secured at such a conference.
While a Review Conference can be called by the Tenth Session
of the General Assembly, by a majority vote and by a vote of any
seven Members of the Security Council, such a conference can be
called by any session of the General Assembly by a two-thirds vote
and by a vote of any seven Members of the Security Council. If,
therefore, there is any serious question at the Tenth Session as to the
imminence of a disarmament agreement, it might be wiser to postpone the decision on the holding of the conference until such an
agreement was more nearly assured.
If there are good reasons for holding such a conference, the
difference between a majority vote at the Tenth Session of the General Assembly for holding it and a two-thirds vote at a later session
is not likely to be a major hurdle. Indeed we might suggest that a
two-thirds vote of the Members of the United Nations for the holding of a Review Conference would be one important indication that
it would be a useful and significant occasion.

THREE BACKGROUND STUDIES
I11 a-ECONOMIC

AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS

The U.N. Charter recognizes the relation between political
problems and economic and social conditions; One of the purposes
of the U.N, stated in the Charter, is to help solve international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character and
to promote human rights and freedoms for all. The Charter thus
reflects the belief that economic and social injustice are among the
most important causes of war and regards peace not as.a period of
inactive truce but as the energetic pursuit of the common good of all
mankind. This was not a new ideal discovered for the first time at
San Francisco. The Covenant of the League of Nations expressed the
same ideal. In fact, much of the existing machinery of which U.N.
is justly proud is to be found in embryonic form in the organization
of the League. On the whole those parts of the U.N. machinery
which function most effectively are those which inherited the tradition and experience of the older organization. At the same time it
has to be recognized that much of the League's work in this field
was tentative, experimental, and relatively insignificant.
The greater stress which United Nations places on the economic
and social aspects of peace-making is exemplified in the existence of
a special Council on Economic and Social Affairs (ECOSOC). The
League had no organ corresponding to ECOSOC, and consequently
its social and economic activities tended to be treated much more as
side issues than is the case with the U.N. today. ECOSOC consists
of 18 Member Governments, six elected by the General Assembly
each year for a three-year term. Though there is no stipulation in the
Charter as to membership of the Council, in practice the five great
powers have been permanent members. In addition, the membership
reflects so far as possible the various interests and the geographic
spread of the total membership of the U.N.
The functions and powers of ECOSOC are defined in Articles 62
to 66 of the Charter. These empower the Council to ". . . make or

Initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic,
social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and
make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations, and to the
specialized agencies concerned." ECOSOC may also "coordinate the
activities of the specialized agencies," "take appropriate steps to o b
tain regular reports from the specialized agencies," and "communicate its observations on these reports to the General Assembly."
Finally, ECOSOC "shall perform such functions as fall within its
competence in connection with the carrying out of recommendations
of the General Assembly" and may "perform services at the request
of members of the United Nations and
of specialized agencies."
ECOSOC's field of activity is thus a very wide one and not covered simply by summoning the delegates of 18 nations to two sessions
annually, each lasting from six to eight weeks. As is the case with
the General Assembly, the committee method has to be adopted to
get through the agenda. The Council has two committees corresponding to the main committees of the Assembly and dealing respectively with economic and social matters. A third committee, the
Technical Assistance Committee (TAC), has been established to
supervise the expanded technical assistance program. As with the
main committees of the Assembly, all of the 18 Members are represented on these three ECOSOC committees.
More continuous study of some of the matters for which the
Council is responsible is undertaken by the eight Functional Commissions. These Commissions have a membership of 15 or 18 governments-not individuals, though in fact governments have wisely
avoided changing their representative more often than has been a b
solutely necessary. The Commission on Human Rights, which is
perhaps the best known of these Functional Commissions, has been
meeting regularly for several years and has at last produced draft
covenants for the consideration of the Council and subsequently of
the General Assembly. The membership of the Commission has of
course changed as certain governments withdrew at the end of their
three-year terms, but a core of its members now know one another
extremely well and can conduct their debates with considerable freedom and informality. The Human Rights Commission has established a Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
the Protection of Minorities. This consists of twelve members who
serve as individuals and not as representatives of governments.
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ECOSOC has also established three Regional Economic Commissions: for Europe (ECE), for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE),
and for Latin America (ECLA). These economic commissions have
their own staffs and hold annual meetings of Members and Associate
Members in their respective areas. heir-headquarters are at Geneva,
Bangkok, and Santiago de Chile.
The ten Specialized Agencies* are not so integral a part of the
ECOSOC structure as are "the various Commissions already referred
to. ECOSOC, however, is empowered to bring the Specialized Agencies into relationshiv with the United Nations and to co-ordinate
their activities. Hitherto co-ordination has been exercised mainly in
the field of technical assistance, a program in which all the Specialized Agencies are concerned. The Technical Assistance Board
(TAB) provides co-ordination at the executive and administrative
level and reports to ECOSOC's Technical Assistance Committee.
Certain other inter-governmental agencies have a special relationship to ECOSOC and submit reports to it. Some, such as the
Permanent Central Opium Board, have a long history going back to
the days of the League of Nations; others, such as the Children's
Fund (UNICEF), were established to meet particular circumstances
and have already acquired a more or less independent existence.
Article 71 of the Charter empowers the Council to make arrangements for consultation with Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) which are concerned with matters within its competence.
ECOSOC's Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations approves or rejects requests from organizations wishing to enjoy consultative status with the Council. A small number of NGOs have
the right to address the Council direct if the Council so approves.
Other organizations, numbering some 250, may present their views
to the Council's Committee on NGOs
A
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* The Specialized Agencies are as follows:
Iaternational Labour Organization (ILO), Geneva
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) , Rome
U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Paris
World Health Organization (WHO), Geneva
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), Washington
International Monetary Fund (FUND),Washington
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Toronto
Universal Postal Union (UPU) ,Berne
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) , Geneva
World Meteorological Organization (WMO), Geneva
Two additional Specialized Agencies are in process of formation: the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization, and the International Trade Organization.

How ECOSOC Has
Functioned Hitherto
From many points of view the annual sessions of the council,
totaling perhaps 15 weeks in the year, are too short to cope with the
large and varied agenda. A glance at the list of items discussed at
Geneva during the 18th Session of the Council will show how varied
and miscellaneous this agenda can be. Thire were reports from eight
of the Specialized Agencies and from UNICEF, from three of the
functional Commissions, and from one regional Economic Commission. This might be regarded as routine work and for the most part
was so treated, but unless a report can be given at least one day's
consideration it seems hardly worth making. The other items on the
agenda of the 18th Session ranged from "The World Economic
Situation" (including the question of full employment, on which
documentation ran to nearly 1000 pages) to "World Calendar Reform"; from "Technical Assistance" to "Conference on Customs
Formalities for the Temporary Importation of Private Road Vehicles
and for Tourism." Clearly the items were not all of equal importance
and, in fact, the delegates did not so treat them. The items of less
importance had to have some discussion if at all possible, and their
inclusion on the agenda of a six-weeks' session contributed to the
sense of rush and shortage of time which most ECOSOC delegates
feel.
Faced with the necessity of getting through its agenda somehow,
the Council not surprisingly adopts the useful but humble role of a
post office. Since something must be done about the matters brought
to its consideration, the easiest thing for the Council to do is to pass
them on to someone else. Some items, including the World Calendar,
were sent to Member Nations for comment, but the favorite destination is of course the General Assembly. There are several reasons
why the Council should tend to act as a forwarding agency between
other U.N. organs and the Assembly. Pressure on the Council to act
in this way frequently comes from the underdeveloped countries
who command a much larger voting strength in the Assembly than
they do in the Council. If they feel that the Council is not giving
proper attention to their demands for assistance, they have reason to
hope that in one of the committees of the General Assembly they
will receive more sympathetic treatment.

ECOSOC is under another form of pressure to send matters on
to the Assembly without wasting too much time upon them. Its 18
Members are empowered to act on behalf of the U.N., but they
realize, and are sometimes reminded, that there are 42 other Member
States who may have views on the matters under discussion. The
18th Session, for instance, was presented with the draft Covenants
on Human Rights, the final product of five years' labor by the
Human Rights Commission. To have debated the substance of these
Covenants in the course of the session would have been quite impossible and in any case futile, since the Covenants are of importance
to all U.N. members and even to States which do not yet belong. On
this matter, therefore, ECOSOC's 18th Session merely discussed the
wording of the covering letter to accompany the Covenants to the
Assembly.
Action of this kind makes the Council appear to be a somewhat
insignificant center of the complex organization which it is supposed
to control. It might, in fact, be said that the parts are greater than
the whole. This is not only true of the Specialized Agencies, which
have their own constitutions, membership (often larger than the
membership of U.N.), and budgets; it is also the case with some of
the subsidiary organs of the Council such as ECE, whose annual
session is often attended by delegates of higher rank than those
whom governments normally send to ECOSOC sessions. This is not
altogether surprising since the ECE session has a limited and clearcut agenda and lasts only two weeks. One may expect a Minister of
Finance or Trade to attend such a meeting and thus to lend importance to the debate. One cannot expect cabinet ministers to attend a
session, taking six weeks, in which important items are intermingled
with matters which would never come before a national cabinet. All
' these factors contribute to the situations described by Mr. Loveday
in the following terms: "It [ECOSOC] is, unfortunately for it, both
the leader and the led, and the best proof that it is not fulfilling the
role of leader lies in the fact that on the one hand it has constantly
found its agenda overcharged, and on the other, it is not being used
for problems of major importance."'
-
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1 Loveday, A. Suggestions for the Reform of the U.N.Economic and Socia2 Machin-,
International Organization, August 1953 (40 Mount Vernon St., Boston, Mass.).

Reform and
the Future

Delegates and members of the secretariat who have had long
experience of ECOSOC are well aware of the Council's shortcomings. ECOSOC has not proceeded to an immediate reform of the
World Calendar but it has adjusted its own calendar in the hope of
making sessions more effective. An attempt is to be made to grade
items according to their importance and to devote one of the
ECOSOC sessions to a full debate on a few matters of outstanding
importance. It is hoped that government delegates of high rank will
be sent to a session if it is known beforehand that the debates will
concentrate on major questions (e.g, the world economic situation)
and will not be interrupted for the consideration of secondary matters. If possible this majorj ECOSOC session should be held at a time
when the rest of the U.N.program is relatively quiet. This would
enable ECOSOC to enjoy a little more of the limelight. Though this
would have its dangers, these are probably outweighed by the
advantages.
While ECOSOC has been considering reforming its own p r e
cedure, the U.N. Secretary General has been busy with a protess
described as "streamlining." It was felt that the activities of the
U.N. in the social and economic field had become too diffuse and
that concentration on selected subjects would produce better results.
These developments are good. We believe that the U.N. as a
whole will operate more effectively if ECOSOC concentrates on
important projects. ECOSOC??role in coordinating the Specialized
Agencies should continue to be emphasiz<d and should find expres
sion in its agenda. Governments should be encouraged by NGOs
and others to take more important policy questions in international
economic and social affairs to ECOSOC.
It would be foolish to expect that changes of this kind will bear
immediate fruit. Greater impetus and clarity of purpose may emerge,
but it must be remembered that there are limits to the process of
coordination. Though it is true that the debates in ECOSOC are
often conducted in an atmosphere of greater harmony than those in
the General Assembly, it is nevertheless doubtful whether agreement
will be reached in the immediate future on an over-all U.N.program
in the economic and social field-and perhaps this is just as well.

There is little reason to supposeathateven a reformed ECOSOC
would cease to be used from time to time as a propaganda platform.
The division between economic and political issues is not a hard and
fast or a very clear one, so that the various "cold wars" will no doubt
continue to invade an ECOSOC session as they have done in the
past. Members who can amicably discuss the technical assistance
program become less friendly when questions such as forced labor
or Arab refugees are brought to their notice. Sometimes controversial items are introduced into the agenda in order to score
points in the propaganda war, but this should not blind us to the fact
that in economic and social as in political matters there are profound
differences in outlook and feelings. No reform of ECOSOC, however far-reaching, will brinh; a speedy end to a debate between a free
and a planned economy.
It would be useful if ECOSOC and its subordinate organs could
make increasing use of independent technical experts in initiating
and conducting studies. This has been done in the case of the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection
of Minorities, the Permanent Central Opium Board, some of the
subsidiary organs of the regional Economic Commissions, and the
recent meeting of experts on the proposed Special U.N. Fund for
Economic Development. Independent experts find it easier than governmental representatives to concentrate on technical questions and
minimize political considerations. Related to this is the possibility of
making greater use of "working parties" meeting in private during
ECOSOC sessions in a search for agreement away from the glare
of publicity.
In one respect the changes which we have suggested might
increase rather than diminish the tension in ECOSOC debates. Rep
resentatives of a higher caliber would bring more public attentionin itself a desirable thing-to the work of the Council. This in its
turn would increase the propaganda value of the meetings. There is
much value in a high-level debate on the relative merits of industrialization and rural community development, but the public and
the press seem at times to prefer a scrap. However, this is not necessarily a vicious circle. Recent debates on economic and social matters
(both at ECOSOC and the General Assembly) have revealed a new
alignment of parties in which the underdeveloped countries, if not
from China at any rate from India to Peru, show a wonderful unanimity in trying to force the industrialized nations of the West to

come to their aid. So far the communist countries have been interested spectators of this battle. If the underdeveloped countries can
continue to press their claims with the force and good sense that
they have shown so far, they may be able to induce capitalists and
communists to compete for the privilege of helping them.
It has also to be remembered that international action in the
economic and social fields is not hampered by a history of failure as
has been the case in the field of disarmament. Action may hitherto
have been modest but this is due as much to the low priority given
to it as to failure to agree on any action at all. In principle everyone
supports the purposes of U.N. in this field; in practice the implementation of these purposes is postponed. The history of the expanded program of technical assistance' shows what can be done
when the nations are agreed on a course of action and are fired with
enthusiasm for carrying it out. This program also shows how important it is to secure international cooperation, since the defection
of one important contributor may easily discourage the rest. Other
fields in which agreement and cooperation have been achieved are
for the most part technical and scientific ones. It would appear that
governments are more ready to accept a scientist's view of what is
good for the world than to follow the advice of economists or sociologists. It is not impossible, however, that a strong lead in one of
the more controversial fields would win a response.
Finally, we think that the NGOs can do more than they have
done in the past to strengthen ECOSOC's work. NGOs have a
special relationship to ECOSOC and have the right to present their
views on items of the Council's agenda. Some NGOs have not been
entirely satisfied with the machinery which ECOSOC has provided
for this aspect of their consultative status. Improved methods of
obtaining the views of NGOs have been discussed, and some are
likely to be adopted by the Council Committee on NGOs. If NGOs
are thus afforded better opportunities to make their views and experience known to the Council, it is incumbent upon t p m to perform more adequately their task of making the work of the Council
better known.
The effectiveness of NGOs as supporters of ECOSOC has been
somewhat impaired by their tendency to group themselves into supporters of UNICEF or WHO or some other single aspect of the
social and economic work of U.N. Thus the size and breadth of the
ECOSOC agenda divides the NGOs into small and sometimes com-

peting groups. It is another case of the parts being greater or stronger
than the whole. It may be asking rather a lot to expect a children's
organization to take an intelligent interest in full employment;
nevertheless, consideration might be given to adopting more widely
an arrangement recently established in London. The Standing Conference on the Economic and Social Work of the United Nations
(SCESWUN!) brings together a large number of NGOs in Britain
and has adopted the practice of issuing resolutions over the names
of supporting organizations. Groupings of this kind should prove
effective in expressing unoflicial opinion to national governments.
NGO representatives at New York or Geneva sometimes tend to
forget that ECOSOC is made up of government delegates who often
arrive bound by the instructions of their Ministries. More effort is
needed in the national capitals to see that these instructions are
favorable to making ECOSOC a more effective instrument.
One point which NGOs could stress with their national governments is the importance of providing for international social and
economic work to be planned on a long-term basis. So far nearly all
this work has depended on annual budgets whose renewal is far
from assured. The recent experience of the technical assistance program shows how precarious this situation may be. Dr. Brock Chisholm, former Director General of WHO, has expressed this difliculty
in the following terms:

". . .

it must be recognized that progress in changing obsolete
practices has been extremely slow. As an example of difficulty in
adapting procedures to international needs is the inability of most
countries to make financial commitments for more than the current
fiscal year. The programs of international agencies cannot be efficiently planned over so short a span. Procurement of materials alone
usually requires six to nine months. Budget-making begins of necessity two to three years in advance in view of the numerous essential
discussions, clearances and training of local personnel

. . ."

NGOs should continue to urge greater support of United Nations programs. They should urge that this support, in so far as
possible, be scheduled further in advance. Nations no doubt have
good reasons to be proud of their own efforts on behalf of refugees
or underdeveloped countries, but they should not make these efforts
an excuse for failing to contribute to U.N. work. Nations which have
declined to contribute to the Special U.N.Fund for Economic De-

velopment (SUNFED) have based their rdusal on prior commitments to national programs. Frequently they are spending on these
national programs far more than they would be expected to contribute to an international one. It might be supposed in consequence
that the international program would not make any significant difference to the work already being done. In fact, however, experience
shows that U.N. technical assistance is often mare readily accepted .
than assistance coming from one nation only, especially if that nation
happens to be a great power. Furthermore, even a relatively small
outlay such as SUNFED may demand from each Member Nation
would contribute enormously to the effectiveness, authority, and
prestige of U.N.
This brings us to a more general and perhaps more intractable
problem, that of increasing the international outlook among men
everywhere. We are still living within the walls of national communities and concentrating on the defense of these communities
against real or imagined human enemies. It will be an extremely
d%cult task to wean men from their customary thinking in and on
behalf of natidnal groups and to transmit their energies into an
attack on ignorance, poverty, and disease. Nevertheless, the successful
completion of the social and economic tasks of U.N. demand this
sort of transformation in men's thinking.
Summary of Suggestions
1. Governments should be encouraged (by non-governmental groups
and by others) to take more important policy questions in international social and economic affairs to the Economic and Social
Council.
2. In order to avoid overlong sessions, the agenda items,are being
classified and certain sessions devoted to a few important questions
of world-wide interest. The value of the debates on these important
questions would be greatly enhanced if governments were represented by delegates of a high rank.
3. If possible the ECOSOC session at which high ranking officials
discuss important matters should be held at a time when the U.N.
program is otherwise fairly quiet. This would enable ECOSOC
to enjoy a little more of the limelight. The dangers involved in this
are clear, but the-advantages might outweigh them.
4. In the initiation of studies by ECOSOC, greater use should be
made of independent technical experts and less use made of intergovernmental commissions. As a rule agreement on technical considerations is-easier if political considerations can be left out of
'
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account. Subsequent political agreement which cannot easily be
dispensed with may be facilitated if the experts have first agreed
on the technical aspects of the matter under discussion.
5. NGOs should seek more effective ways of making ECOSOC's
activities better known. They should & i d as much as possible
becoming partisans of limited aspects of ECOSOC's work but,
singly and cooperatively, should encourage governments to support
steps to make ECOSOC a more effective instrument. They should
urge governments to supplement national programs of aid with
financial and other support for international U.N.programs. They
should urge that, in so far as possible, governments schedule contributions further in advance to permit more orderly program
planning.

I11 &PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Is there enough power undergirding the efforts of the United
Nations to settle political disputes? If not, what types of additional
power, or authority, would contribute to dy effectiveness of the
U.N.'s peaceful settlement work?
These questions are basic to the considerations surrounding any
Charter review conference. There is no reason, however, for these
questions to be any easier to answer in the field of international disputes than would similar questions which might be asked in the field
of labor-management disputes-or indeed in any form of conflict
settlement. Every dispute has its own characteristics and its own
human equation. The general field of dispute settlement has always
been one in which generalization is hazardous. But with a Charter
review conference in prospect, some analysis should be attempted.
Before venturing on this uneasy ground let us look briefly at the
general setting in which the U.N.'s more specific mediation and
conciliation work takes place.
Buttressing the special efforts of the United Nations to settle
particular conflicts such as those in Palestine, Indonesia, Kashmir,
and South Africa has been the general work of the organization in
the economic, social, and trusteeship fields. By the constant adjustment of conflicting economic interests, by stimulating economicdevelopment programs through the provision of technical assistance,
by helping to establish common objectives in the social field, and by
providing a framework through which dependent peoples can
progress toward self-government, the United Nations is helping to
channel into patterns of orderly evolution a multiplicity of problems
-many of which would otherwise develop into threats to peace. This
is peaceful settlement at its best-in the early stages and on a preventive basis.
No less important is the general political work of the General
Assembly. Here, at the beginning of each Assembly, each national
delegation has the opportunity to air its grievances, to state its concerns, and to make its contribution to the climate of opinion in which
the succeeding political business will be conducted. While more and
more specific disputes are being brought to the attention of the Gen-

era1 Assembly, the Assembly is especially well adapted to the trans
action of what might be called "general political business of international interest."
The Assembly is the town meeting of the world. Thus to refer
to it is not to deprecate its power-as anyone familiar with a New
England town meeting should know. Trial balloons are sent u p
and brought down! Log-rolling and block voting take place. But
beneath it all essential fact-finding and fact-assessing take place. Influences of conciliation and mediation are brought to bear. Important
principles are delineated and agreed upon. Adjustments and compromises take place. This is essential international political business
in the modern world--conducted as it must be in a common setting.
It would be difticult to maintain that the General Assembly would
be any less effective if its membership were universal. On the contrary its prestige and effectiveness as an organ of conciliation would,
we believe, be enhanced if there were a prompt move toward universality.
If the Assembly is to play an increasingly effective role in the
peaceful settlement of disputes, either directly or through subsidiary
bodies, must it be given more legal power through a Charter review
(or revision) conference?
b

Scope and Powers of the
General Assembly

While the United Nations Charter conferred upon the Security
Council special responsibilities in the maintenance of international
peace and security, substantial responsibilities were also given to the
General Assembly. Under the Charter the General Assembly may
(1) "discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the
present Charter
.";I
(2) "consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and secu(3) "discuss any questions relating to the maintenance
rity . .
of international peace and security brought before it by any Member
of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which
is not a Member of the United Nations . .";3 (4) "initiate studies
and make recommendations for the purpose of . .promoting inter-

..
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1 Art. 10.
2 Art.

3 Art.

1I, par. 1.
11, par. 2.
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national cooperation in the political field. . ."4 "Subject to the
provisions of Article 12 [consideration by the Security Council], the
General Assembly may reconimend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to
impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the
present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the
United Nations.'"
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish any prob
lun of peaceful settlement which would be excluded from General
Assembly consideration under these broad provisions. Excepted only
are questions under consideration by the Security Council. A means
for the orderly and vetoless transfer of any of these problems to the
General Assembly "if the Security Council is failing to exercise its
function of maintaining international peace and security" is provided
by the "Uniting for Peace" resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1950, following the outbreak of the Korean War.
If the General Assembly has sufIicient scope to consider any
problems which might arise, what of its power to deal with this wide
range of issues ?
There are two principal aspects to this felt need for more power
in the United Nations. The first concern is for an organization with
su6eient moral, economic, political, and police s t r e n a for would-be
adventurers to be deterred by this combined strength (and by predictable consequences) from embarking upon, or continuing, a
to the disruption of the international public
course of action leaorder. A second concern is for the authority and prestige to deal with
political disputes-if possible before they become threats to the peace.
The United Nations Charter distinguishes, in general, between
the functions of the Organization in handling threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression (Chapter VII) and the
settlement of the background political disputes which may have
caused the disruption of public order (Chapter VI). In the former
case the Organization may make recommendations for (or, in the
case of the Security Council, decide upon) measures, including the
use of armed force, to maintain or restore international peace and
security. In its efforts, however, to get a settlement of the political
issues which may have caused the dispute, the primary reliance is
Art. 13, par. 1.
aArt.14.
.
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upon the methods of investigation, conciliation, and mediation. In
dealing with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of
aggression under Chapter VII it is even suggested that, in calling
upon the parties to a dispute to comply with provisional measures,
these measures might well be "without prejudice to the rights, claims,
or position of the parties concerned."@In its work under Chapter VI
the Security Council may go so far as to recommend terms of settlement if it "deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and ~ecurity."~
Otherwise, while the Council may recommend or initiate appropriate
methods or procedures of adjustment, it may make recommendations
with regard to terms of settlement only on the request of the partiesO8
It is evident that those who framed the Charter believed that the
full power of the United Nations should be used to restrain threats
to the peace and, if a breach of the peace or an act of aggression had
already occurred, to restore international peace and security. While
they were not prepared to have this same power used to enforce a
particular form of political settlement, the Security Council was
empowered to recommend terms of settlement if the Council concluded that international peace and security were "likely to be
endangered." A similar power appears now to reside in the General
Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution.
In other types of conflict settlement a public recommendation
by the mediating body has often proved an effective means of
securing agreement. The fact that even this limited power of recommendation has been used so infrequently by the U.N. suggests that
Charter limitations may not at the present time be a major handicap
to the development of the U.N.'s peaceful settlement activities. If the
members of the United Nations have been reluctant to encourage the
use of that power which the Organization now possesses, it is even
more unlikely that they would, barring a drastic alteration in international legal relationships, take the further step of bringing some
form of compulsory arbitration more into the forefront of the U.N.'s
peaceful settlement work.
Not all the advocates of more power for the General Assembly
are seeking an increase in its legal power. Mr. John Foster Dulles, in
his speech of January 18, 1954, before the Subcommittee on the
-
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best arrangement? If the &era1 Assembly is to assume greater responsibilities, then should there not be some form of weighted voting,
so that nations which are themselves unable to assume serious military
or financial responsibilities cannot put those responsibilities on other
nations? Should there be, in some matters, a combination vote;
whereby affirmative action requires both a majority of all the members, on the basis of sovereign equality, and also a majority vote, onl.
a weighted basis, which takes into account population, resources,?

i
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The Secretary obviously had in mind the exploration of
Charter changes which might give more practical political power toi
the General Assembly. It is difficult in theory to argue against ~ h a r - k d i
ter modifications which it might at some future time be possible to
achieve along these lines. The present voting system does exert certain restraints on the large powers. This makes for a system in which
at times the full scope of the diplomatic resources of these powers .has been used in the search for support on certain issues. While there$$
are some countries that would look with favor on voting changes in
the Assembly, it seems likely that if the United States were to emphasize such revision as one of its principal objectives in a Charter review
conference, many of the small countries would lose some of their
interest in such a conference. They are not likely to look with favor
on revisions which would reduce their power. Even a simple majority T?
vote on the holding of such a conference might under these
stances be very dificult to obtain.

,-
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Creating an
instrument of Trust

-

-,5
In questions of the settlement of international disputes, the essen- {f+
tial problem is not that of the legal power of the United Nations. $'$
4

The problem is that of creating out of the United Nations an instru- :!
ment of trust which can be relied upon to render effective service in
the peaceful settlement field. While certain minor adjustments in the
Charter might facilitate the creation of such an instrument, the basic
problem is not the formal enabling powers of the Charter. It is a ' .. LH?
question of assembling within this area of U.N. activity persons who ' s
because of their political wisdom and experience, their insight into
-

contemporary issues, and their personal integrity inspire confidence
that the vital national interests with which they deal will be handled
with resourcefulness, patience, and care. It is also a question of estab
lishing a more effective means through which certain lessons can
be drawn from past experience-experience both inside and outside
the United Nations.
Let us look first at this question of past experience. The United
Nations staff is now engaged in the assembling of a general repertory
of Security Council experience and of general experience under the
Charter. But not since-the Interim Committee was, for all practical
purposes, laid to rest in 1950have the members of the United Nations
made any sustained effort to draw lessons from the U.N.'s past work
in dispute settlement. Luis Padilla Nervo of Mexico in September
1952, on the occasion of his turning over the presidency of the General Assembly to Lester B. Pearson of Canada, suggested that the
General ~ s s e m b establish
l~
a committee to concern itself with the
development of the U.N.'s peaceful settlement work and that this
committee operate parallel to the Collective Measures Committee.
This apparently useful suggestion was not taken up by the General
Assembly.
What
new approaches might a review of past experience
suggest r'
While different disputes call for different handling there has
been a'general trend in recent years away from extensive debate and
"instructed" commissions toward a more flexible and informal use
of the United Nations' peaceful settlement facilities. It is easy to
understand the reluctance of states to turn to the United Nations for
help in a dispute in which they are a party if the U.N.'s first move is
to be a public debate in the Security Council or in the General Assembly. The debate is certain to bring new political influences into
the situation, some of them extraneous and many of them unpredictable. The general debate has the possibility of aggravating the
dispute and sometimes of making its ultimate solution more difficult.
Thus a state's decision to submit a dispute to the United Nations is
usually based on its estimate of the possibilities of picking up support
for its case.
But suppose it were possible for the United Nations to provide,
initially, a more informal (and less legislative) type of aid to the
disputants. Might there not under these circumstances be a freer
turning to the United Nations and a freer use of its facilities?
-
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The secretary-%enera19s
Key Role
&

The initial point of regular informal political contact in the
United Nations is the oftice of the Secretary-General. It would appear
to have been the intention of the framers of the present Charter that
the oflice of the Secretary-General should, in its political functions,
be developed over and above that of the comparable oftice in the
League of Nations. Under Article 99 of the United Nations Charter,
"the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security
Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."
It is apparent that both the first Secretary-General and the present one have conceived of their role as being a broad one. Probably
no single individual connected with the U.N.'s peaceful settlement
work can have as much influence as the Secretary-General in building confidence in the United Nations' political work and in making
the organization a "trusted instrument." In order, however, to fulfill
effectively his ofttimes quiet and backstage role, the SecretaryGeneral must have a group of senior ofticers in the political field who
can keep him constantly apprised of important developments in all
major geographical regions with which he must deal. The method
through which this skilled political advice is made available is less
important than that it should be available within the Organization
as a whole. The dictates of good administration would appear to
suggest that such a staff should either be located in the Department
of Political and Security Council Affairs or attached to the Executive
Oftice of the Secretary-General.
Supplemental to those on his own staff on whom he can call,
the Secretary-General has two other principal sources of political and
diplomatic experience to which he can turn-for either informal or
formal assistance.
The heads of the 60 permanent delegations to the U.N. are
continuously available. Some of them have had extensive diplomatic
experience and many of them can be focal points of conciliation as
issues are weighed and negotiated both before and during consideration by the Security Council or the General Assembly. The representatives of certain countries are often able, for reasons both of
geography and interest, to be of special assistance to the SecretaryGeneral on an informal basis. In making the United Nations a

trusted instrument of political negotiation there can be no substitute
for the closest diplomatic relationship between the Secretary-General
and the heads of the delegations representing the Member States.
The Secretary-General and the principal oficers of the General
Assembly and the Security Council have another diplomatic resource
which could be much more fully used. On April 28,1949, the General
Assembly established a Panel for Inquiry and Conciliation. The international Panel was to be composed of persons who "by reason of
their training, experience, character and standing, are deemed to be
well fitted to serve as members of commissions of inquiry or of conciliation and who would be disposed to serve in that capacity." Each
Member State was permitted to designate five persons. The Panel
was to be available to the Security Council and the General Assembly, to their subsidiary organs, or to Member States involved in controversies. The method of selection was to be determined in each case
by the appointing organ. Upon the joint request of the parties to a
controversy, appointment could be by the Secretary-General, the
President of the General Assembly, or the chairman of the Interim
Committee. The administration of the Panel was lodged with the
Secretary-General.
The theory behind the Panel was an eminently good one. It was
believed that it would facilitate the U.N.'S dispute settlement work
to have in being a roster of persons well qualified for service as
members of mediation or conciliation commissions-prsons who in
accepting designation had entered into certain informal undertakings as to availability and interest and who were of sufficient eminence to have been designated by their own governments. Initial
designations were for five years. These five years have elapsed, and
the time has now come for the Panel to be reconstituted.
The United Nations Charter encourages parties to a dispute to
attempt to settle the conflict themselves before bringing it to the
United Nations. Should not disputing parties at times be encouraged
to turn to the international Panel and by agreement to secure the
services of one of its members as a mediator and conciliator? Following the lead given by other types of contracts or commercial agreements, treaties between states might provide for certain types of
disputes under the treaty to be subjected to mediation or to arbitration by a qualified person selected £rom the Panel by the two parties
or by the Secretary-General. The Panel has to date been used only
once-in the selection by the Security Council of Dr. Frank P.

Graham as mediator in the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir.
The Panel constitutes a resource for peaceful settlement which could
be more fully used by the United Nations.
The trend toward a more informal type of political negotiation
is further indicated in the increasing use which has been made of the
office of the President of the ~ e n e i aAssembly.
l
At the first part of
the third session of the General Assembly, held in Paris in 1948,
Mr. Evatt of Australia was associated with an effort, authorized by
the Assembly, to conciliate the dispute over the Greek children. In
1950, as President of the Assembly, Mr. Entezam of Iran served as
chairman of two different good offices commissions set up by the
General Assembly in an effort to seek a solution of the Korean conflict. During the fall of 1951 Mr. Padilla Nervo of Mexico, as President of t h e ~ s s e m b l served
~,
as the chairman of a closed conference
of the principal powers concerned which made an effort, during the
Assembly, to break the disarmament deadlock. Mr. Pearson of Canada during his presidency of the General Assembly in the fall of
1952 was deeply involved in efforts to achieve an armistice in Korea.
The articles relating to the composition and use of the Panel for
Inquiry and Conciliation permit the President of the Assembly and
the Secretary-General to appoint persons from the Panel to undertake tasks of inquiry or conciliation when requested to do so by a
treaty or by the parties to a dispute. There would appear to be no
reason, however, why the President of the General Assembly and the
Secretary-General could not, if they so desired, associate some member of the Panel with them in any informal conciliatory work in
which they were engaged. Both men are free to appoint such assistants as they require. Through such informal association, experience
could be gained against the time when formal appointment might
be made by conflicting parties or some special responsibility assigned
by the Security Council or the General Assembly. Persons from the
reconstituted Panel could be asked occasionally to serve as rapporteur
of the Security Council, in keeping with the recommendati6i of the
Interim Committee in April 1949. The history of international mediation has been a history of the
search for the impartial and effective third party. We have commented on the importance of having readily available, competent,
and impartial individuals who are in a position to use their good
officesin disputes previous to or during the more formal consideration of thesequestions by one of the established organs of the United

Nations. Let us now turn to alternative methods that might be employed by the Security Council, the General Assembly, or a subsidiary
organ in the consideration of disputes.
Privacy
in Negotiation

It has been suggested that a rapporteur might be appointed to
negotiate with the parties following the opening statements by the
parties in the Security Council or in the General Assembly. The
President of the Security Council has at times performed this function. There are times when it is desirable for the opening statements
of the parties to be followed by statements on the part of other members which reveal the degree to which sentiment exists for peaceful
settlement--or for a particular type of settlement. To allow the debate to go on to the passage of a resolution frequently results, however, in a hardening of positions and an exacerbation of the conflict.
It has been suggested, therefore, that the Security Council and
possibly even the General Assembly should experiment with a plan
under which, in certain cases, it would terminate debate following
the principal statements on the part of all interested parties and at
that point turn the negotiation over to a more private treatment.
This suggestion is well worth exploring. The Security Council has
already begun to experiment with a variant of this approach in
occasionally taking a "consensus of views" rather than calling for a
formal vote. We have mentioned the working party approach as used
on the disarmament question at the 1951 session of the General
Assembly in Paris, when the debate in the Political Committee was
adjourned to permit a ten-day closed conference of the countries
principally concerned to meet under the chairmanship of Mr. Padilla
Nervo, the President of the Assembly. A similar approach was used
by the Second Committee during the 1953 session, when a subcommittee met in closed session under the chairmanship of Mr. Mates
of Yugoslavia in an effort to reach agreement on the Special United
Nations Fund for Economic Development.
Perhaps enough has been said to indicate that the United Nations has by no means exhausted the possibilities of further shaping
its -procedures and its personnel in ways which could aid it in gaining
the confidence and trust of its members in its work in peaceful settlement. It is not so much by reaching after the spectacular as by

"month to month" .gains in these areas that the U.N.'s reputation
will eventually be built
Power to Recommend
Terms of Settlement

Let us return now to the question of the power of the Security
Council or of the General Assembly, or of one of their subsidiary
organs, to recommend terms of settlement to parties in dispute. We
have indicated that this was a power which the United Nations has
thus far been reluctant to use. Mediators or conciliation cofnmissions
have frequently urged the parties in private to accept particular terms
of settlement, but the Council and the General Assembly have been
chary of attempting to go on record on behalf of such detailed terms.
The veto is a constant hazard in the Security Council, and the General Assembly because of its size is hardly adapted to the detailed
consideration required in these matters. Furthermore, such resolutions tend to freeze the situation and reduce possibilities of later
compromise. There are, therefore, substantial arguments against
more frequent attempts by the Security Council or the General
Assembly to recommend specific terms of settlement.
Could not a case be made, however, for subsidiary negotiating
organs, appointed either by the Security Council or the General
Assembly, to have more freedom to make recommendations for settlement, and to release these recommendations if they felt that public
coqideration of them might promote a settlement? It seems likely
that if the negotiating organs had the power to publicize recommendations, the disputing parties might take these recommendations
more seriously in the preceding private negotiations. We have suggested that this has been the experience in other types of conflict
settlement. It is the usual practice for the parent body to retain its
freedom of action, but public discussion of recommendations made
by a subsidiary body enables both parties to assess more accurately
their respective positions-and the needs and possibilities of compromise.
It would undoubtedly be very much easier for U.N. commissions
and mediators to develop and use recommendations if, as proposed
by the Vandenberg resolution adopted by the Senate in June 1948,
the veto could be removed by voluntary agreement from "all questions involving peaceful settlement of international disputes and

p

situations." The Security Council would then be able y slmple
majority vote to fix flexible terms of reference for its subsidiary negotiating bodies. It would also be freed to give more active support-to
such bodies, including, if it appeared in order, support to either
general or specific recommendations for settlement.
To what extent is Article 37 of the Charter a handicap to the
development of this procedure? This article permits the Security
Council to make recommendations on terms of settlement in cases
in which the Council decides "that the continuance of the dispute is
in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security." The General Assembly has not been given such powers
explicitly, but it would be difficult, following the series of Assembly
resolutions on Palestine and the subsequent passage of the "Uniting
for Peace" resolution, to maintain that such powers were
There is an understandable reluctance among states to have disputes to which they are a party deemed a danger to the peace. The
words of Article 37, however, are mild ones-"likely to endanger."
It would be dif£icult in this anxious and frequently trembling world
to conclude that any dispute between two countries of suflicient importance to be put on the agenda of the Security Council or the
General Assembly did not in fact fall into this category. There may
be times, however, in which it is not politic or conducive to a prompt
settlement to say so. It might thus be wise, at some time when other
Charter revisions are being made, for Article 37 to be redrafted. In
the meantime, in an international situation in which we are in much
need of plain speaking about the importance of avoiding disturbances
to the peace, this Article should not be a serious handicap to the
development and use of the power to recommend terms of
settlement.
In a world so unsteadied by the ever-present possibility of the
misuse of unprecedented power, who is there among us to say that
our intergovernmental institutions would not serve us better if they
could, with common consent, be substantially altered? But any such
common consent will only flow from a much clearer conviction than
appears now to be evident that our principal diiliculty lies in Charter
limitations. Any general sampling among those reasonably well
versed in United Nations affairs would, we believe, show an overwhelming conviction that we are not making effective use of the
legal instrument we now have. Greater use can be made of the ogces
of the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly.
-

lack in^.

The Panel for Inquiry and Conciliation can be reconstituted. FU&
use can be made of the power to make public recommendations
While we seek opportunities and agreements to perfect the Charter
let us realize that in creating an institution of trust, it i
tion that makes the greatest difference.
Note: This background study in substantially the same
peared in the November 1954 issue of the Annals of the A
& emy of Political and Social Science under the title "Developing the
'
Peaceful Settlement Functions of the United Nations." This issue of the
Annals dealt with the future of the United Nations.
I'
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Summary of Suggestions

I

1. The conciliatory work of the General Assembly would be enhanced if there were a prompt move toward universality of U.N.
membership.
2. The Security Council should put less emphasis on passing resolutions. It should experiment more frequently with turnink disputes
over for some form of private negotiation after the interested parties have ex~ressedtheir views.
:A4
3. The ~ e n e r aAssembly
i
has, on several recent occasions, suspended ?'
debate and turned issues over temporarily to "working parties" - . '
with instructions to the smaller group to see if they could find an
acceptable compromise. This technique should be used more £requently during the General Assembly and occasionally, on the
instructions of the Assembly, in an effort to make progress on ,
issues between regular sessions or while the Assembly is in
adjournment.
4. In view of the trend away from extended and formal debate of
political disputes, and toward a more informal use of United Nations facilities for peaceful settlement, greater emphasis should be
placed on conciliatory moves which might be initiated by the
Secretary-General and by the President of the General Assembly.
5. In April 1949 the General Assembly established an International
pane[ on Inquiry and ~onciliationiThe Panel was to be composed of persons from U.N. member countries qualified to serve
the United Nations in fact-finding or conciliatory missions. Those
persons nominated by governments were to serve for five years.
The membership of this Panel should now be reconstituted. Persons serving on the Panel should be used more frequently in
U.N.'s disp;te settlement work.
6. The dispute settlement work of the Security Council is subject to
the veto of any Permanent Member (U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K., France,
China'). A new effort should be made to eliminate the veto in all
questi6ns relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes.

7. The Security Council now has the power in international disputes
to recommend terms of settlement if it "deems that the continuance
of the dispute is, in fact, likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security" (Article 37, (2)), or "if all the
parties to any dispute so request" (Article 38). The General Assembly has such powers of recommendation under ,Article 11.
Greater use should be made of these powers.
8. At some time when Charter changes are being made, the language
of Article 37 (see 7, above) should be altered to eliminate the
restriction on recommendations of terms of settlement to situations
"likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security

."

roughout its history the Society of Friends has
inst war. This conviction as to the evil
Quakers into special efforts to remove the economic and social cause4
of conflict and to promote the settlement of international disputes
peaceful means. It has also promoted direct efforts to secure
abolition of war as an institution and, through disarmament,
restrict the means by which nations might make war on one moth
The States which are members of the United Nations have in the
Charter pledged themselves to "settle their international disputes b
peaceful means" and to "refrain in their international relations fro
the threat or use of force" (Article 2). But despite these undertakings, Members have found it impossible to act as though they had
renounced war as a means of settling their disputes. States have continued to place their primary reliance upon either their own armed
strength or upon regional defense systems. The arms race has accelerated. Weapons of war have become progressively more destructive and the competition in weapons of planet-destroying potentiali
has clearly led to the point where only some radically new
is likely to give us the security we seek.
There are those who would rely on the horr
weapons as the principal safeguard against their use. To thoughtfu
and sensitive political and military leaders a revulsion against the
probable results of using these weapons is undoubtedly a powerful
deterrent. But the general concern with which the disarmament negotiations in the United Nations are being followed suggests that ar#
increasing number of people are looking for a security system which
would remove the principal weapons of war and not be so dependen
on a balance of power or on the forces of self-restraint.
An agreement on disarmament has been exceedingly difficult
attain. Any such agreement is obviously related to the lessening o
political tensions and to the achievement of political agreements
especially over Germany and Formosa. Settlement of issues a
42

vated by the "cold war" would facilitate agreement on disarmament.
But it is @y
true that a workable disarmament scheme would, if
adopted, greatly facilitate settlement of the other problems which so
deeply divide the major powers. Even the serious discussion of disarmament programs can contribute to the general lessening of
tensions.
Although it is not directly part of a disarmament plan, the move
in the United Nations toward international cooperation to develop
the peaceful uses of atomic energy is an example of the type of international arrangement which could eventually facilitate agreement
on disarmament. Delegates have referred in U.N. General Assembly
debates and in the meetings of the U.N.Disarmament Sub-commission to the importance of developing plans for using atomic energy
constructively as an accompaniment to a program for controlling the
destructive uses of atomic power. There is cause for considerable
optimism in the achievements of the Ninth ~ e n e r a l ' ~ s s e m bwhich
l~,
voted unanimously in favor of the establishment of an International
Atomic Energy Agency to facilitate world-wide use of atomic energy
for peaceful purposes. This Assembly also supported unanimously
.the calling of an international conference to consider means of
developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy through international
cooperation. Success in this area may well help to create a climate in
international relations which would permit significant progress in
the disarmament field.
The main purpose of this background study is to examine the
manner in which disarmament might affect, or be affected by, the
structure and functioning of the United Nations. The essential fea'tures of a disarmament program will be brought out by considering
several questions some of them still controversial. These questions
will need to be considered at great length by experts as well as by
the general public, but as a basis for discussion of U.N. Charter
revision brief answers are suggested here.
What Should Be
the Purpose of Disarmament?
The purpose should be not merely to ease tax burdens or to make
war more humane; it should be to eliminate the possibility that war
will occur.
a
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Should a World Disarmament Plan Provide or a
Partial Reduction of Armaments or for Their Complete
Elimination, with the Exception of Such Arms as
Would Be Necessary to Preserve Internal Order
and to Fulfill Charter Obligations?

.I

'

The United Nations Charter apparently does not envisage complete disarmament, but arms limitation and regulation. The Charter ,
makes reference to disarmament and the regulation of armaments.
For example, the General Assembly is given the power to discuss the general principles governing these matters and to make recommendations to the Security Council (Article 11). The Security Council
is charged with the responsibility of formulating plans to be submitted to Member States "for the establishment of a system for the
regulation of armaments" (Article 26). The Charter provides for
military forces to be put at the disposition of the Security Council
for the purpose of suppressing aggression.
The present efforts in the United Nations Disarmament Commission are directed to the early limitation of national armies down ,
to agreed levels and the abolition and control of weapons of mass
destruction. Various governmental statements have been made suggesting an ultimate goal of disarmament down to levels needed for
internal national policing and to fulfill U.N. Charter obligations.
There are good reasons why this ultimate goal should be given much
more thorough consideration as an immediate objective. Both practical and moral reasons may be advanced in favor of such substantial
disarmament. Attempts to determine the quantities of armaments,
the types of weapons, the number of men under arms, etc., to be
allowed for almost 100 states would inevitably lead to prolonged
disagreement. Agreement on the first steps might actually be easier
to reach in the context of a much larger plan which provided for the
fixing of the internal policing levels eventually to be reached in
proportion to national population and similar factors. Moreover, in- 1
spection and enforcement are likely to be more difticult if nations
retain some offensive weapons and the forces capable of employing
them. We believe any disarmament scheme should provide for the
ultimate elimination of all armed forces, all armaments, and all
weapons except for such forces and small arms as might be necessary
for maintaining order within each country and fulfilling U.N.
Charter obligations.

Should a Disarmament Plan Be Universal,
Applying to All Nations?

It is clear that any politically possible disarmament plan would
need to include all the major powers, including the People's Republic
of China. It might be essential that the eventual agreement include
all countries. At some point those countries not represented in the
United Nations must be brought into the negotiations. While any
agreement among the major powers would likely be considered first
in the United Nations General Assembly, a United Nations sponsored General Disarmament Conference might possibly be the place
to seek the formal approval of the wider U.N. Membership.
Should Conventional Weapons and Weapons of Mass
Destruction Be Covered by the Same Disarmament
Plan and Controlled by the Same Machinery?

It would probably be most practical to have a single system to
cover all types of armaments. Conventional and nuclear weapons are
apparently too interrelated in their use to permit effective control of
one unless co-ordinated with control of the other. The U.N. recognized this when it formed a single Disarmament Commission to
replace the two which had formerly been working separately on
atomic matters and conventional weapons.
What Should Be the Nature of an Inspection
Agency-its
Powers, Functions and Procedures?

The powers of an inspectorate should include authority to examine documents relating to military budgets; to enter each country
and to move to any point within the country at will; to maintain
observers at strategicpoints to watch for dangerous concentrations
of armed forces or weapons; to enter any factory or installation (with
the exceptions to be specified); to secure pertinent information by
whatever means it deemed best, such as questioning managers or
employees, observing processes, counting, weighing, or measuring
materials, or consulting records; and to assemble and communicate
the results of its inquiries to appropriate headquarters. It should not
be given authority to undertake any correction of conditions based
on its discoveries but would report its findings to a U.N. organ. It

should be a tedmhlly. cotxlpe~~nt
&;Lan furce,-ond.&odd.not ire
armed. The insphctorate would be under ,the.generql dl+n
of .an
International Control Agency or a Disarmament ~ u t h o f i t ~ .
These powers are suggested in the belid that the duty of the
inspectorate would be to observe and certify the destruction or other
disposition of aimaments in all countries and, thereafter, to detect
any attempt to manufacture or accumulate arms or train soldiers
which had been restricted by international agreement. Inspection to
accomplish this end would have to be unfettered and continuous. It
would be necessary to guard against abuse of this power and interference with 'the peaceful economic facilities of the countries in
which the inspectorate was working. However, shce its purpose
would be to detect illegal activities, the inspectorate should not be
so limited that such activities could .escape detection. Complaints
about improper exercise of authority by inspectors would be lodged
with the Disarmament Authority for consideration and action.
In view of the uncertainty that now prevails as to whether any
inspection force could, in fact, be assured that all atomic and hydrogen weapons had been rendered useless for destructive purposes, the
inspection force should concern itself with the various possibilities
that exist for the delivery of such weapons.
How Should the Problem
of Compliance Be Handled?

This is one of the most difficult aspects of the disarmament problem. We have suggested earlier that disarmament down to agreed
levels for national armies, while no doubt a desirable first step, represents an inadequate goal. While inspection machinery could be
established for such a disarmament plan, effective means of dealing
with violations would be dif£icult in the face of still substantial
national armies. Violations or suspected violations of the disarmament treaty could be taken by the Disarmament Authority to the
United Nations Security Council or to the General Assembly or both,
and the issues could be debated and the force of world public opinion
brought to bear. Special investigating commissions could be-established to weigh the facts. Under the Uniting for Peace Resolution,
the General Assembly could recommend economic, political, or military measures against the country believed to be violating the dis
armament agreement. But these measures all carry the weakness

qtith which. the United Nations .is already beset. They do not give
*suancee af getting beyond the use af war as a sanction. Our sights
need to be on a .mote viable security system.
A second approach is disarmament of national armies down to
the levels needed for internal policing and the creation of a United
Nations armed police force. There are many people who believe that
during the period required for any step-by-step reduction of national
armaments, there should be in existence a United Nations armed
force capable of balancing out any temporary inequities or disequilibrium which might develop in progressive disarmament under
an agreed plan. The efforts, however, to make the Military Staff
Co&tteeteean effective instrument of the United Nations foundered
on the conflicts inherent in the "cold war." It does not seem likely
that at the present time the U.S.S.R. would take kindly to a move
now to create any new United Nations armed force capable of acting
against either armed or partially armed States and free from the
veto. The tensions of,the East-West conflict will probably force those
concerned with disatmament questions to seek other solutions than
the two which we have discussed thus far.
A third approach would be to give the U.N. or one of its organs
authority to deal directly by judicial process with individuals (rather
than governments) found guilty of violating the disarmament agreement. Some advocates of limited world federation maintain that any
disarmament plan, if it is to be effective, must provide for this degree
of direct action upon individuals. If this procedure were adopted,
the disarmament treaty would presumably provide that the domestic
jurisdiction provisions of the Charter did not apply in such cases. It
would establish procedures under which such persons would be
apprehended and brought before an international court which would
.apply the "disarmament law."
There is a great need for extending the rule of law in the international community. There would be many reasons for questioning
the effectiveness of the present collective security system, even in a
partially disarmed world. Many people believe that a disarmament
treaty can provide the occasion for new and important developments
in international law, but few people are clear as to just what these
should be.
It would seem likely that the types of inspection, verification
and compliance problems which would arise under a disarmament
treaty would be better handled within the general pattern of ad-

ministrative 1aw.than they would be in the present pattern of political action by the United Nations. To move in this direction would
mean a major extension of the international legal system and in all
likelihood the modification of the Statute of the present International Court or the.creation of a new court to deal with disarmament
problems. It would not necessarily mean the application of "disarmament law" to individuals. National law provides for legal action
against corporations, against municipalities, and even against political bodies. While oficers of these bodies are sometimes held personally responsible, it is usually the organized unit against which the
legal or enforcement action is taken.
The pattern of international legal development would obviously have to be built on the special requirements of the disarmament-security problem. It would need to be related effectively to
differing patterns of national jurisprudence. The development should
be such, however, that it deals as directly as possible with the "parties" believed responsible for violations of the treaty. In view ~f the
gravity of the security problem now faced by the international community, it should be possible to accompany disarmament with an
enforcement pattern which minimizes action against major political
units. This is an area in which an enormous amount of legal work
needs to be done.
A general enforcement pattern of this kind would mean that,
in cases of suspected violation of the disarmament agreement, following the verification of the inspector's report by the central inspection authorities, an attempt would first be made by the Disarmament Authority through regular administrative channels to get
compliance or cooperation. If this failed, the facts would be made
public. If defiance continued, the case would be taken to the DroDer
international court to get a restraining order against the responsible
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party" or unit.
It would be only those cases that defied settlement by legal
means or major and flagrant violations of the agreement that would
be taken to a political organ of the United Nations.
We thus have two major suggestions as to how the problems of
enforcement can be handled. First, the more substantial the extent
of agreed disarmament, the easier it will be to ensure that the agreement is enforced. Second, that increasing emphasis should be placed
on the non-political aspects of disarmament enforcement. Inspection
is a technical function. The U.N. machinery for dealing with threats
A

to or breaches of the peace is a political function. Between these two
' there should be a middle stage-so developed as to constitute the
primary reliance. It would be based upon fact-finding and conciliation, and would culminate in a judicial process. It is possible that all
except major and flagrant breaches of a disarmament agreement
could be handled in this way without involving the present U.N.
machinery for dealing with threats to or breaches of the peace.

What Should Be the Timing of the Various Steps
in Carrying Out Disarmament?
The question of timing has been one on which wide disagreement formerly existed between the Soviet and Western powers. From
the inception of disarmament discussions within the U.N. until 1954
the U.S.S.R. insisted upon a complete and unconditional ban on
weapons of mass destruction as the first step to disarmament. The
Western powers suspected that the Soviet Union was attempting to
neutralize their most important weapons in order to leave itself in
a position to dominate the West with its stronger conventional
armaments.
At the meetings of the Disarmament Subcommittee in London
in 1954, France and the United Kingdom submitted a proposal for
timing, the most noteworthy feature of which was a provision for
a conditional ban on the use of weapons of mass destruction as the
first step. Under such an agreement, all powers would agree not to
use the prohibited weapons except in defense against aggression.
Although little progress toward agreement was apparent in the
London discussions in 1954, optimism was generated during the
Ninth Session of the General Assembly later in the year. At that time
the Soviet Union agreed to accept the Anglo-French proposals as a
basis of discussion at further meetings of the Disarmament Subcommission. It now seems that agreement on this dificult question
may be in sight.
Disarmament and
the United Nations
How would a disarmament plan relate to the United Nations?
We have already touched on this question. Before considering
it further let us first summarize a few of the thoughts developed in

'1

the preceding discussion concerning the nature of an effective dis b
armament plan. The plan should:
1. Be based upon agreement among the major powers.
2. Be framed in a treaty applying to all nations, which s h d d
if possible be accepted by the vast majority of the world's
nations, including of course the major powers.
3. Cover both conventional weapons and weapons of mass
destruction.
4. Express the agreed-upon basis for disarmament.
a) The extent to which disarmament was to be carried.
b) The stages through which the elimination of armaments
and armed forces would proceed.
c) A timetable for the accomplishment of the various stages.
5. Provide for progression from stage to stage.
6. Establish an international inspection force and define its
duties, authority, procedures, and relationships to a Disarmament Authority.
7. Define the relationships of the Disarmament Authority to '
the United Nations and to its organs.

-

It is hard to imagine ktfective arguments for creating a disarmament plan separate from the United Nations. Indeed, several considerations suggest that the disarmament machinery be made
integral part of the United Nations. First, the United Nations would
be strengthened by being able to make real progress toward one of
its major objectives-the maintenance of peace; second, existing
machinery, personnel, and facilities of the United Nations could be
used in connection with the plan, thus avoiding duplication; third,
coordination with other activities of the United Nations would be
easier.
We have suggested the desirability of an enforcement system
which would be based upon new developments in the international
judicial system. The Disarmament Authority to be created as a special organ of the United Nations in the disarmament treaty would
report to the Security Council, the General Assembly, and all signa-.
tories of the treaty. It is. obvious that the Aqthofity must be free to
operate by majority vote. The General Assembly would be in a
I;osition to act if a veto threatened in the Security Council.
The Charter disclaims any tight of the United Nations to inter,
fere in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
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of any State. Inasmuch as an inspectorate would be required to enter
and move freely within each nation and report on what it discovered,
a disarmament treaty would need to provide that these inspection
activities did not constitute an infringement of domestic jurisdiction
or it would need to relate this question to Article 2 (7)' and to Chapsome' change in Article 2 (7) would
ter VlI by protocol. Otherwise
,.*.
be required.
Articles of the Charter dealing with representation, membership, admission of new members, suspension, and expulsion of members would need to be re-examined. Since the disarmament plan
ought to cover all the nations and since it should be implemented
through the United Nations, the U.N.should move promptly toward
universality of membership. This means a new effort to eliminate
the veto on questions of membership. There should probably be no
expulsion allowed, although suspension, as envisaged in Article 5,
might be continued. It is possible that some changes would be reqd,red in Chapter VII of the Charter, in which is defined the role of
the Security Council in handling threats to the peace, breaches of
the peace, or acts of aggression. Indeed, Article 47 of that Chapter,
dealing with a Military Staff Committee, is a dead letter at the present time. In Chapter VIII, "Regional Arrangement$' some changes
in wording might be required to put the Charter in harmony with
the more important changes in earlier sections.
Finally, some Articles of the Charter, such as 53 and 107, should
probably be changed to eliminate references to "enemy states," which
are put by the original wording of the Charter in a special category.
Such provisions would no longer be realistic or necessary if a universal disarmament plan were adopted.
How can the "will to disarmament," essential to carrying any
program through, be created? We have referred earlier in this background study to the pressures growing out of the competition in
atomic and hydrogen arms. We are now faced with nothing less than
the question of the survival of the human race. Nor should we forget
the new schools, the new hospitals, the new homes, the new opportunities for producing food and clothing, the better life which
1 Article 2 (7) states, "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures
ndm Chapter VZZ." (italics ours)

could result for us and for dthers the woild over if there were an end
of the arms race. To threse things we could add the deep satisfaction
which would rightly be ours from having brought under control
man's greatest and most impressive problem.
Summary of Suggestions
1. Disarmament should be universal. It is essential that any agreement include all the major powers. It should eventually include all
countries. This means that at an early date all the major powers
must be brought into the negotiations and that, at a later stage,
all countries must participate in the negotiations.
2. Disarmament should be carried out through the United Nations.
This would be facilitated if all nations were Members. A new
effort should thus be made to eliminate the veto as it applies to
membership.
3. If agreement on disarmament were reached, an entirely new administrative and supervisory organ would need to be created to
exercise control over the agreement or the treaty and to administer
the inspection system. This agency might be called the Disarmament Authority. It should be an organ of the United Nations.
4. The Disarmament Authority should report to the Security Council
and the General Assembly, as well as to all States adhering to the
treaty. It should be free to make decisions by majority vote.
5. The international inspection force must have unhindered access to
all arms-producing facilities and all military staging points. They
must have complete freedom to report.
6. The enforcement provisions of the disarmament treaty should be
based upon prompt judicial review of, and action on, suspected
violations.
7. The Charter prohibition against interference in the domestic affairs of Member States (Article 2 (7)) would need to be qualified
by amendment, or by having the nations agree in any disarmament
treaty that inspection and enforcement activities do not constitute
such "interference," or by special protocol relating the disarmament agreement to Article 2 (7) and to Chapter VII.
8. Since provision should be made for the German people and for
Italy and Japan to attain membership in the U.N. and to be covered by the disarmament agreement, Articles 53 and 107 (which
refer to "enemy states") would need to be amended.
9. That part of tLe charter which deals with regional arrangements
(Chapter VIII) would need to be harmonized with any other
changes made.
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ARTICLES OF U.N. CHARTER ON
AMENDMENT PROCEDURE
Arficle 7 08

Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for
all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted
by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly
and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including
all the permanent members of the Security Council.
Article 7 09

1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations
for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter may be held at a
date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of
the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the
Security Council. Each Member of the United Nations shall have
one vote in the conference.
2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a
two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes by twothirds of the Members of the United Nations including all the
permanent members of the Security Council.
3. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth
annual session of the General Assembly following the coming into
force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference
shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote
of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven
members of the Security Council.
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STATEMENT O F THE AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE
COMMITTEE ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY
OF THE UNITED NATIONS
,The American Friends Service Committee wishes to express to the
United Nations, on the occasion of its Tenth Anniversary, a message of
gratitude and hope-gratitude for the d r s t decade of accomplkhments
and confident hope in its future.
Even thovgh governments have not yet been willing fully to explore
its potential for peace, the United Nations is an instrument of great value
for the settlement of international conflicts. We pledge our cooperation,
along with others of like mind, to the promotion of peace through the
United Nations.
In the joint effort of nations to cope with the basic social and economic problems of the world, the United Nations has made an invaluable
contribution. We are gratified to have been able to cooperate in its work
for refugees, in Korean rehabilitation, and in various social and technical
assistance programs. The Committee will continue to offer its services as
opportunity affords within the limit of its resources.
The United Nations offers leadership both to governments and to
individuals, symbolizing, as it does, the faith of all men in the development of a peaceful and brotherly world community.
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